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RACIST HEALTH CARE? 
Barbara A. Noah* 
During the past few years, rationing has become an explicit feature 
in decisions concerning optimal delivery of health care services, and it 
poses difficult choices for health care providers and policymakers. 
Insurers and patients increasingly must balance the desire for access to 
every possible treatment against concerns about affordability. Cost­
driven treatment decisions are becoming an unavoidable reality for most 
patients. Apparently, however, another more pernicious type of rationing 
occurs in this country. It does not depend on factors such as the 
likelihood of an optimal outcome, the comparative efficacy of different 
available treatment modalities, or even the ability to pay for care. 
Instead, a growing body of evidence suggests that the race of a patient 
may adversely affect the quantum and quality of health care provided 
to minority patients. Although no one has identified overt racism by 
providers, such inequities in the delivery of health care services pose 
serious problems. 
This essay describes racial disparities in three separate health care 
contexts: the utilization of Medicare services, the selection of recipients 
for cadaveric organ transplantation, and t.lJ.e representation of racial and 
ethnic minority groups in clinical research. The essay then suggests 
ways in which medical educators, health care providers, and government 
agencies can work to address these disparities in care, and it explores 
possible constitutional and statutory remedies for the victims of 
disparate treatment. Ultimately, the medical establishment must face up 
to the possibility that Mrican-American patients do not receive equal 
treatment in the health care system. 
A study recently published by a team of investigators affiliated with 
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) presents startling 
evidence of racial inequities in the delivery of health care services.1 
* Adjunct Professor (Health Care Law), University of Florida College of Law and 
College of Health Professions; B.A., 1987, Union College; J.D., 1990, Harvard Law School. 
1. See Marian E. Gornick et aI., Effects of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of 
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Although previous studies have examined the utilization of health 
services among different racial groups, the studies often used race as a 
surrogate for socioeconomic status? Thus, these studies frequently 
attributed differences in the quality and quantity of care afforded to 
minority patients to disparities in income.3 The HCFA study represents 
one of the first attempts to control for income among different popula­
tions, allowing the investigators to identify variations in the utilization 
of health care services based on race alone.4 
The HCFA investigators used Medicare administrative data from 
1993 concerning more than 26 million beneficiaries, combined with 
Census data on estimated household income, to determine whether and 
to what extent race and income affect the utilization of health care 
services and mortality.s The investigators focused on four categories of 
health services: first, visits to physicians for ambulatory care and 
hospital discharges; second, hospitalizations for ischemic heart disease, 
coronary-artery bypass surgery, and a type of coronary angioplasty; 
third, mammographies (an elective Medicare service) and hip-fracture 
repairs (a non-elective Medicare service); and, fourth, the amputation of 
a lower limb and bilateral orchiectomy.6 
The data identified significant differences in rates of utilization of 
health care services and mortality between white and African-American 
patients. Among the HCFA study's findings, African-American men 
were 19% more likely to die than white men (after adjusting for age and 
gender only).7 After adjusting for income, the ratio did not change 
Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 791, 797-98 (1996) (stating that 
"blacks and lower income white beneficiaries" of Medicare may be receiving poorer quality of 
care than "white or more affluent beneficiaries"). The authors note, however, that the opinions 
expressed in their article do not necessarily reflect those of HCFA. See id. at 798. 
2. Id. at 792. 
3. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Goldberg et aI., Racial and Community Factors Influencing 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Rates for All 1986 Medicare Patients, 267 JAMA 1473, 
1473 (1992) ("Access to care is a critical issue ..• for racial minorities who may have 
inadequate care due to inadequate financial resouces •..."); Robert A. Hahn & Donna F. 
Stroup, Race and Ethnicity in Public Health Surveillance: Criteria for the Scientific Use of 
Social Categories, 109 PUB. HEALTH REP. 7, 8 (1994) (stating that the "concepts of race or 
ethnicity" as criteria for federal studies are poorly and briefly defined). 
4. See Gornick et aI., supra note I, at 792. 
5. Id. An editorial accompanying the study suggests a pair ofmethodological weaknesses: 
the investigators relied solely on Medicare administrative data because they lacked access to 
detailed medical records, and they used aggregated rather than individual income data. See H. 
Jack Geiger, Race and Health Care-An American Dilemma?, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 815, 815­
16 (1996). 
6. See Gornick et aI., supra note I, at 792. Bilateral orchiectomy involves the surgical 
removal of the testicles to treat metastatic prostate cancer. 
7. Id. at 793. 
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dramatically; African-American men were still 16% more likely to die 
than white men.s African-American women were 16% more likely to 
die than white women9 and adjusting for income made no difference 
among the women. IO After adjusting for income, African-American 
women were 25% less likely to have mammograms than white women, 
and African-American patients of both sexes were 7% less likely to visit 
physicians for ambulatory care. 1\ 
The data also suggested a tendency of health care providers to pursue 
less aggressive therapies for African-American patients who did seek 
medical care. Certain types of procedures were performed less frequent­
lyon African-American patients than on white patients, even after 
income adjustment. 12 For example, white patients were at least twice 
as likely to undergo a type of coronary angioplasty, coronary-artery 
bypass surgery, and hip repair surgery.13 In contrast, other procedures 
were performed more frequently among African-American patients. 
After adjusting for income, African-American patients were over three 
times more likely than white patients to have a partial or total amputa­
tion of the leg, and they were more than twice as likely to undergo 
bilateral orchiectomy as a treatment for prostate cancer.14 Significantly, 
in most of these comparisons, adjustments for income differentials did 
little to diminish the racial disparities. 15 The greatest effects of income 
adjustments occurred in the figures for mammography and visits to 
8. [d. at 794. 
9. [d. at 793. 
10. [d. at 794. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 797-98. 
13. [d. at 797 tb1.2. The authors concluded, however, that, with regard to hip fracture 
repair and other non-elective procedures, the rates did not suggest any racial inconsistencies 
because osteoporosis in the femur is 2.4 times more frequent among white women than African­
American women over the,age of 50. [d. at 798. 
14. See id. at 797 tb1.2. "Diabetes is only 1.7 times as prevalent in elderly [African­
American] persons as in whites, however, which suggests that the difference in the rates of 
amputation [of a lower limb] is not entirely explained by the difference in the prevalence of 
diabetes." [d. at 791. As with the data on hip fracture repair, the data on bilateral orchiectomy 
may suggest a disparity that does not really exist because African-American men have 2.2 times 
the rate of metastatic prostate cancer as white men. [d. at 792. However, other troubling 
disparities, such as lower rates of access to primary and preventive care among African­
Americans, may contribute to the differing rates of this advanced form of prostate cancer. See 
id. at 798 (discussing the reasons why African-Americans may suffer from higher rates of 
chronic diseases). 
15. See id. at 794-95,797 tb1.2. After adjusting the mortality and health services utilization 
rates for income-related differences, the investigators found that racial differences diminished 
somewhat but that the overall effect of the income adjustment was relatively insignificant. [d. 
at 791. 
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physicians for ambulatory care.16 For example, among the least affluent 
African-American women, the mammography rate was 39% lower than 
among the most affluent African-American women.17 
Of course, differences in access to, or the utilization of, preventive 
care over a patient's lifetime may account for some of the observed 
disparities in mortality rates and choice of treatments. Once patients 
become eligible for Medicare at age 65, these differences in health 
status may be irreversible. The data may also simply reflect differences 
in the relative health status of the patients in the two groups. IS The data 
do not directly indicate that physicians or insurers provide suboptimal 
medical care to minority patients.19 
Even so, because the studied population shares a common insurer, 
Medicare, and thus enjoys uniformity of coverage for the services 
analyzed, the conclusions of the HCFA study deserve serious consider­
ation. This absence of an "insurance discrimination" factor (whereby 
under-insurance may account for observed differences in treatment), 
together with the adjustment for income among the white and African­
American patients studied, strongly underscores the significance of the 
findings. The HCFA study clearly demonstrates that equal health 
insurance by itself does not ensure equal care. 
A variety of unconscious, and largely unprovable, factors may affect 
health care decisions for minority patients. For example, treating 
physicians may "give up" earlier on their African-American patients, 
either by concluding that certain treatments will be unavailing or by 
resorting to drastic solutions late in the disease process. Health care 
16. See id. at 794-95 (adjusting statistical differences between African-American and white 
patients for disparity in income). 
17. Id. at 795. 
18. Id. at 797-98. The authors of the HCFA study suggest that a variety of factors, such 
as educational, cultural, and behavioral variations, differences in supplementary insurance, and 
the availability of services, also may contribute to racial disparities in health care. Id. at 798: 
see also Jan Blumstein & Beth C. Weitzman, Access to Hospitals with High-Technology Cardiac 
Services: How Is Race Important?, 85 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 345, 346-50 (1995) (discussing the 
relative scarcity of high-technology health care facilities in predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods, and noting that African-American patients may be less likely to travel to such 
facilities to receive high-quality care): Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, 
Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344, 2344 (1990) (noting that African­
Americans are more likely to require health care but are less likely to receive it). 
19. The study reported only aggregated data. Gornick et aI., supra note 1, at 792. 
Disaggregating the data may reveal additional useful information. For example, if the rates of 
usage remain consistent across doctors and institutions, this would suggest a systemic problem. 
However, if more pronounced treatment disparities appear at certain institutions or in certain 
regions of the country, the possibility of conscious discrimination at some facilities becomes 
more compelling. 
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providers sometimes may decide that simplicity or utility more readily 
dictates a decision to resort to drastic solutions; for example, a provider 
may perform a lower limb amputation in the case of diabetic complica­
tions rather than leg-sparing vascular surgery to improve circulation. 
Health care providers also may decide to pursue less aggressive, non­
surgical therapies, such as medication and dietary changes, in the case 
of coronary illness among African-American patients. Physicians' 
treatment decisions may reflect some unstated prejudices-negative or 
pessimistic assumptions about their African-American patients' family 
support networks, dietary practices, or adherence to recommended post­
treatment care regimens. In this sense, unconscious racism may be one 
factor that perpetuates the cycle of poorer health among African­
Americans when compared to the white population. 
In addition to the possibility of individualized prejudices,2° uncon­
scious racism may appear at an institutional level as weU.21 In this era 
of cost-consciousness, hospitals and insurers have created complex 
guidelines to limit the care that patients receive.22 For example, an 
insurance plan that refuses reimbursement for an elective procedure if 
the patient has received less than optimal management of his or her 
disease may negatively impact minority patients, who tend to have less 
access to care overall. Although these guidelines certainly are not race­
based, they may perpetuate the prevalence of certain conditions among 
minority patients. As noted above, a variety of factors other than 
unconscious discrimination contribute to this problem: African-Ameri­
cans tend to make fewer visits to physicians for ambulatory care than 
white patients, and they often seek initial care at later stages of disease 
than white patients.23 Low incomes appear to exacerbate these prob­
lems, but the HCFA study has demonstrated that differences in income 
alone do not fully account for observed disparities in health care 
20. Many people who have learned racist attitudes as children may decide to discard these 
attitudes as adults. but they may not succeed in keeping unconscious attitudes from affecting 
their decisionmaking. making prejudicial decisions despite their own best efforts. See, e.g .• 
Edward P. Boyle, Note. It's Not Easy Hein' Green: The Psychology ofRacism, Environmental 
Discrimination, and the Argwnentfor Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
937.939 (1993). 
21'. See id. ("Institutional racism occurs when the group in power structures i:s social 
institutions so as to maintain its dominance over other groups."). 
22. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort 
Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment? 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1223-30 
(1997). 
23. See Gornick et aI., supra note 1, at 793 (noting that in 1993 African-American 
Medicare beneficiaries made 7.2 visits per person to physicians for ambulatory care compared 
with 8.1 visits per person among white patients). 
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delivery.24 Institutional policies may reflect unconscious biases or, at 
the very least, a lack of concern for existing disparities. 
Racial inequities appear in a variety of other health care contexts. 
Recent statistics suggest some disparities in the rationing of expensive, 
lifesaving procedures and technology. In the area of organ transplanta­
tion, for example, demand far exceeds supply, and the debate continues 
about how best to distribute organs available for transplant.2s In 1984, 
Congress created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
(OPTN).26 The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a private 
non-profit organization, operates OPTN under contract with the federal 
government,27 UNOS coordinates procurement and allocation functions 
and also works to develop equitable policies for organ distribution.28 
For a variety of reasons, African-American patients wait longer to 
obtain kidney and other organ transplants than white patients.29 In part, 
organ donation rates by Mrican-Americans have lagged behind the rest 
of the population, although donations among African-Americans recently 
have increased.30 Because white donors continue to account for most 
organ donations, the number of organs available for minorities is limited 
where immunologic matching is deemed essential.3! In addition, 
24. See id. at 794-95. 
25. In 1993, over 32.000 patients in the United States were awaiting organ transplants. 
Raja B. Khauli, Issues and Controversies Surrounding Organ Donation and Transplantation: 
The Needfor Laws that Ensure Equity and Optimal Utility ofa Scarce Resource, 27 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 1225. 1225 (1993) (citing Patients Waiting for Transplants, 9 UNOS UPDATE. Nov. 
1993, at 38, 38-39). Approximately one-third of patients waiting for a heart or liver transplant 
die before an organ becomes available, and the number of actual donors is significantly lower 
than the source potential. Id. at 1225-26. 
26. See National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1987) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1994». Federal law prohibits the selling of organs or tissue. See 42 
U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994). 
27. Robert S. Gaston, Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The Disparate Impact of 
BLA-Based Allocation. 270 lAMA 1352, 1353 (1993). 
28. See id. (discussing the duties that Congress mandated UNOS perform). 
29. Id. at 1352 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECfOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION: 
ExPEcrATIONS AND PRACfICES 8 (1991»; see also Ian Ayres et aI., Unequal Racial Access to 
Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805,806-12 (1993) (discussing reasons for disparate 
access to kidney transplantation among different racial groups). 
30. See Stuart Auerbach, Organ Donations by Minorities Rise: Blacks' and Hispanics' 
Rates Now Nearly Equal Population Share; Asians' Up Sharply Too. WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 
1996. at 7 (Health Section) (noting that African-Americans donated 11.5% of the 5100 organs 
that were donated in 1994, which represented only slightly less than this group's 12.1 % share 
of the population). 
31. See Khauli, supra note 25, at 1231-32 (stating that the long waiting time for organ 
transplants by minorities may be in part due to the assumption that "universal benefit will result 
from better matching"). 
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demand for transplants may be higher for racial minorities. For instance, 
African-Americans constitute 12% of the population in the United States 
but account for 34% of persons suffering from end stage renal disease 
(ESRD).32 The confluence of these supply and demand factors results 
in longer waiting times for racial minorities.33 African-Americans 
recently accounted for approximately one-third of patients on the waiting 
list to receive kidneys.34 
The emphasis on obtaining better results through close or exact 
tissue-matching helps to explain some of the disparities. Generally, 
donated organs are allocated to medically qualified candidates using a 
point system that takes into account patient proximity. The current 
policies also permit variances to the point system and allow alternative 
local organ distribution units to be established subject to OPTN 
approval.3S For kidneys, livers, and pancreata, potential recipients are 
ranked with points allocated to reflect different criteria, including blood 
type, histocompatibility, sensitivity of the patient to transplantation, 
degree of urgency, and waiting time.36 
In the case of kidney transplantation, UNOS has developed a 
prioritization system that relies heavily on HLA antigen matching to 
determine which patients will receive kidneys as they become avail­
able.37 This policy establishes point values for the quality of antigen 
matches, strongly favoring a lack of mismatches.38 The current system 
significantly curtails access by African-Americans to cadaveric kidneys 
because the likelihood of a perfect HLA match is very low when 
matching white donors with African-American recipients.39 The recent 
increase in African-American donors will ameliorate this problem 
somewhat, but, as noted above, African-Americans constitute a 
disproportionately large percentage of ESRD patients awaiting trans­
plant. Increased kidney donation rates among minorities will not fully 
32. Gaston, supra note 27, at 1354. 
33. Khauli, supra note 25, at 1231-32. 
34. See Gaston, supra note 27, at 1352 (stating that 31 % of the people on waiting lists for 
a kidney are African-American). 
35. 59 Fed. Reg. 46,482. 46,486-87 (1994) (to be codified at 42 C.ER. § 121) (proposed 
Sept. 4, 1994). For example, alternative local organ distribution units might be permitted to 
develop interregional or intraregional organ sharing arrangements. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Gaston, supra note 27, at 1353. 
38. See id. ("Enhanced gift survival for [HLA] matched recipients ... was determined to 
outweigh all other claims on a donated organ and to justify the excess cost and effort required 
to transport kidneys on a national leveI."). 
39. See id. at 1354 ("[T]here will always be white patients who match the donor 
population better than [African-American] patients."). 
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meet the needs of the African-American patients at any time in the near 
future. 
Physicians and medical ethicists have expressed concerns about the 
criteria used to determine which patients will receive organs for 
transplantation. In particular, the emphasis on tissue matching for kidney 
allocation has attracted significant criticism. The preference for a perfect 
antigen match in kidney transplantation appears unnecessary in this era 
of highly efficacious anti-rejection drugs such as cyclosporine.4o 
Physicians question the heavy emphasis on perfect HLA matching, 
suggesting that the relatively small gains in successful outcomes do not 
justify the disparate impact of such policies on African-American 
transplant candidates.41 One group of commentators argue that the 
emphasis on HLA matching unjustly disfavors interracial transplantation, 
noting that white dialysis patients are more than twice as likely as 
Mrican-American patients to receive a kidney allograft.42 They contend 
that enhanced transplant survival for perfectly matched kidneys does not 
necessarily outweigh other factors relevant to the selection process such 
as age and waiting time.43 These commentators suggest explicitly 
offsetting the racial disparities that result from the HLA matching 
system by awarding points to Mrican-Americans to compensate for 
points accumulated by caucasians on the basis of HLA matching.44 
Although successful transplantation obviously represents the primary 
goal, the federal statute directs oP1N to allocate organs "equitably 
among transplant patients" and "in accordance with established medical 
criteria."4S Overemphasis on improving outcomes does not promote 
equitable allocation and also makes little financial sense. The costs 
associated with preserving and transporting perfectly matched kidneys 
to more distant locations outweigh the medical costs saved through 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. at 1352 (8.3% versus 3.9%). "At the University of Alabama at Birmingham (with 
a waiting list [for kidney transplantation] that is 65% [African-American]) only one of 33 
kidneys ... received as part of the [perfect] antigen-match program has been for [an African­
American] patient." Id. at 1353. 
43. See id. at 1354 (noting that, although a clear correlation exists between HLA match 
and outcome in transplantation from living donors, the benefits of a perfect HLA match in 
cadaveric transplants is less clear). 
44. Id. at 1355. Of course, before tissue matching can begin, the patient must meet 
specified medical criteria to gain access to the transplant waiting list. One study found that in 
the southeastern United States, physicians refer African-American patients for transplantation less 
frequently than white patients. See J. Michael Soucie et aI., Race and Sex Differences in the 
Identification o/Candidates/or Renal Transplantation, 19 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASES 414, 414-17 
(1992). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A), (D) (1994). 
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fewer retransplantations or returns to dialysis.46 In addition to reducing 
the disparate impact on minority transplant candidates created by the 
current preference for perfect matches, a system that combines partial 
matching with a regional hierarchical approach may prove more cost 
effective.47 
The conflict between concerns about transplant efficacy and 
distributive justice continue in the area of organ transplantation. In 1996, 
the federal government held a public forum to discuss proposed changes 
to policies for allocation of livers and to patient listing criteria for liver, 
kidney, and kidney/pancreas transplants.48 Under rules proposed in 
1994, the OPTN would consider somewhat different criteria during the 
organ allocation process. In addition to considering established medical 
criteria and length of time on the national waiting list, OPTN would be 
charged with the task of developing policies that more effectively take 
into account potential recipients whose immune systems make it difficult 
for them to receive organs, thereby seeking to minimize organ wast­
age.49 However, the proposed rules have not been finalized. 
Certain clinical research practices play a role in perpetuating racial 
and gender inequities in health care. For instance, new drug trials and 
other types of biomedical research frequently fail to include subjects 
from minority groups.50 The desire to simplify and streamline such 
research has led investigators to prefer homogenous patient popUlations 
for virtually all studies.51 Before the National Institutes of Health (Nlli) 
issued a directive in 1990, new drug investigations almost uniformly 
tested drugs only on white male subjects, excluding women and 
46. See David W. Gjertson et aJ., National Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys by HLA 
Matching: Projected Effect on Outcome and Costs, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1032, 1034-35 
(1991) (stating that a hierarchical HLA matching system would not increase costs and would 
increase overall survival rates if the hierarchial system replaced the present absolute HLA 
matching system). 
47. [d. at 1035. 
48. See 61 Fed. Reg. 46,658 (1996). 
49. 59 Fed. Reg. 46,482, 46,497 (1994). In discussing the proposal, the PHS notes that 
organ allocation poses difficult issues: 
For example, efforts to promote service to the sickest patients first versus those 
likely to survive the longest may conflict Similarly, some policies intended to 
maximize transplant outcomes and based on sound scientific data may have adverse 
implications for one ethnic group in particular, or for residents of particular 
geographic areas. 
[d. at 46,486. 
50. Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 24,24. 
51. [d. at 25. 
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members of other races.52 The 1990 policy requires that applicants for 
clinical research grants either include women and minorities in their 
studies or provide a "'clear and compelling rationale'" for failing to 
include these groups.53 The NIH policy finally recognized that using a 
homogenous research population may provide little therapeutic benefit 
for persons outside that population when a treatment becomes generally 
available. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also has tried to 
address the issue through product approval guidelines that apply whether 
or not the clinical trials receive NIH funding.54 
Although researchers offer a number of possibly valid reasons for 
excluding women from clinical studies-including concerns about harm 
to fertile women who may become pregnant, and complications posed 
by the female hormonal cycleSS-no such justifications exist for 
excluding African-Americans and other minorities from biomedical 
research populations. On the contrary, scientific research has document­
ed the wide variation of the pharmacokinetic effects of drugs across 
racial and ethnic lines.56 One cannot, therefore, safely extrapolate from 
52. Id. at 24. 
53. Id. (quoting NIH, Priority Announcement, Special Instructions to Applicants Using 
Fonn PHS 398 Regarding Implementation of the NIHIADAMHA Policy Concerning Inclusion 
of Women and Minorities in Clinical Research Study Populations, Dec. 1, 1990). 
54. See 60 Fed. Reg. 46,794 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314, 316) (proposed 
Sept. 8, 1995) (proposing rule that would require manufacturers seeking new drug approval to 
submit safety and efficacy data reflecting breakdown according to gender, age, and racial 
subgroups (in addition to aggregate data), but that would not require inclusion of these groups 
in clinical trials); 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,408 (1993) (summarizing a guideline concluding that 
the exclusion of women from early clinical trials is not medically necessary since the risk of 
fetal exposure can be minimized by patient behavior and laboratory testing); see also Lars Noah, 
Constraints on the Off-Label Uses ofPrescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 
139, 139-40 (1994) (describing the prevalence ofoff-label prescribing by physicians, necessitated 
by limitations in clinical testing, and the FDA's regulatory responses). 
55. See Joan W. Scott, How Did the Male Become the Nonnative Standard for Clinical 
Drug Trials?, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 187, 187 (1993) (describing two contradictory assumptions 
that have contributed to this phenomenon: that women are identical to men so that female 
participation in drug trials is unnecessary, and that women are so unlike men that female 
participation in drug trials would destroy the purity of the experiment). 
56. See Paul Cotton, Is There Still Too Much Extrapolation from Data on Middle-aged 
White Men?, 263 JAMA 1049, 1049-50 (1990) (stating that, although different races may 
respond differently to the same drug, white men stilI are precominantly used in drug testing); 
Craig K. Svensson, Representation of American Blacks in Clinical Trials of New Drugs, 261 
JAMA 263, 264-65 (1989) (concluding that, because investigators do not adequately account for 
racial differences as a source for variability in drug research results, insufficient data exist to 
assess the safety and efficacy for the African-American popUlation of many drugs currently on 
the market); Hong-Hao Zhou et aI., Racial Differences in Drug Response: Altered Sensitivity to 
and Clearance ofPropranolol in Men of Chinese Descent as Compared with American Whites, 
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 565, 566-68 (1989) (concluding that Chinese men have greater 
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data based on white males to others in the population.57 In fact, the 
risks to women and minorities who make an informed choice to 
participate in closely monitored and controlled research are more 
justifiable than the greater risks associated with the use of approved 
drugs or treatments, untested in these populations, on a widespread 
basis. Some have suggested that decisions to exclude women and 
minorities from biomedical research reflect an assumption that white 
males most deserve the benefits that this research produces.58 Further­
more, diseases that affect a disproportionately large number of women 
or minorities historically have received low research funding priority.59 
Prospective solutions to the problem of racial disparity in health care 
delivery will likely be more effective at raising awareness of and 
prompting response to the problem. An editorial accompanying the 
HCFA study makes a number of suggestions about how the medical 
community should respond to the evident racial inequities in the delivery 
of health care services.60 Dr. Jack Geiger, of the City University of 
New York Medical School, concludes that, after controlling for the 
"major confounding variables ... investigators tend to invoke unspeci­
fied cultural differences, undocumented patient preferences, or a lack of 
information about the need for care as reasons for the differences. The 
alternative explanation is racism-that is, racially discriminatory 
rationing by physicians and health care institutions.,,61 In response to 
these findings, Dr. Geiger suggests that hospitals incorporate into their 
quality assurance protocols an ongoing evaluation and monitoring of 
racial disparities in the provision of services.62 He also urges medical 
schools to train students about issues surrounding race and health care, 
including courses designed to increase sensitivity and improve under­
standing of diverse ethnic groups.63 In addition, physicians already in 
sensitivity than white men to the effects of the drug on heart rate and blood pressure); see also 
The 1984 Report of the Joint National Committee on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of 
High Blood Pressure. 144 ARCH. INT. MED. 1045. 1054 (1984) (noting that, although African­
Americans suffer from a higher incidence of hypertension, certain ACE inhibitors are less 
effective in treating this condition among African-Americans than in the white population). 
57. See Dresser, supra note 50. at 26 (describing a study in which the "normal" dosage 
of Lithium for white males was found to be frequently toxic for African-American patients). 
58. Id. at 28. 
59. [d. at 26. 
60. Geiger, supra note 5, at 816. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. 
63. See id. (noting that in one study only 13 out of78 medical schools offer such courses 
and that "all but one of those courses were elective"). 
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practice can educate their peers about these issues through continuing 
medical education programs. 
Regulatory agencies also can play a role in focusing attention on the 
problem of racial inequalities in the health care system. HCFA might 
require more careful utilization review methods designed to identify and 
correct any observed racial inequities in the delivery of Medicare 
services. Similarly, UNOS, which already has demonstrated some 
awareness of the problem, will no doubt continue to gather information 
and shape its allocation policies in a manner that promotes sensitivity 
to race issues in the transplantation process. By carefully monitoring 
compliance with its 1990 directive, NIH can reduce or eliminate 
underrepresentation of minorities and women in clinical trials. Taken 
together, these approaches might close the gap in access to health care 
and, eventually, in the comparative health status of caucasian and 
minority patients. 
Although the medical community must take steps to prevent racial 
bias in the delivery of health care services, victims of existing inequities 
may wish to pursue certain legal remedies. Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 196464 provides the most promising federal statutory avenue for 
dealing with racial discrimination in health care delivery. In enacting 
Title VI, Congress prohibited any entity that opts to receive federal 
financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race in providing 
goods or services to the intended beneficiaries of the federal program.6S 
Because federal financial assistance includes Medicare and Medicaid 
funds and nearly every hospital and nursing home in the United States 
receives such funds, Title VI applies to the majority of health care 
institutions.66 . 
The United States Supreme Court has held that Title VI prohibits 
both intentional discrimination and disproportionate adverse impact.67 
64. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 
200Od-4 (1994». 
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance."). 
66. Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It 
Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 945 (1990). 
67. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (" 'Simple justice requires that public 
funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which 
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.' " (quoting llO CONGo 
REC. 6543 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey quoting from President Kennedy's June 19, 1973 
message to Congress»). In a later case, the Court held that, although Title VI itself prohibits 
only intentional discrimination, the implementing regulations authorize disproportionate adverse 
impact claims. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). 
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The statute is enforced primarily by the administrative agencies that 
provide the federal funding. The regulations implementing Title VI grant 
to federal agencies the power to terminate funding to any recipient that 
violates the nondiscrimination requirement.68 The implementing 
regulations specifically state that facially neutral policies that have a 
disproportionate negative impact on racial minorities violate Title VI 
even if no discriminatory intent exists,69 and administrative agencies 
have consistently concluded that the regulations implementing Title VI 
prohibit policies that have a disproportionate adverse impact on 
minorities.70 
Even so, Title VI only prohibits those inequities that arise from the 
application of facially neutral policies. Title VI does not prohibit racial 
inequities whenever they occur. Thus, the difficulty lies with pinpointing 
the policy creating the disproportionate impact. HCFA might argue, on 
the basis of its recent study, that discriminatory criteria in the health 
care decisionmaking process impede the Medicare program's goal of 
providing consistent, high quality care to all beneficiaries. HCFA will 
find it difficult, however, to identify precisely which policies are causing 
the disproportionate impact. In contrast, federal agencies can more 
readily identify policies causing disparate racial impact in the allocation 
of kidneys for transplant and in clinical research. 
Individual litigation under Title VI offers less promise. The Supreme 
Court has held that a private right of action under Title VI exists only 
in limited circumstances.71 In a private suit, the plaintiff may secure 
equitable relief if able to prove intentional discrimination. The Court has 
not, however, clearly answered the question of whether similar relief 
might be available where the plaintiff can only prove the disparate 
impact of a facially neutral policy.72 Lower courts faced with challeng­
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (providing an opportunity for a hearing prior to termination 
of federal financial assistance based on a violation of Title VI or its implementing regulations). 
69. See 45 C.ER. § 80.3(b)(2) (1996) (prohibiting activities that impair agency objectives 
with regard to race, color, or national origin). 
70. Watson, supra note 66, at 948. Title VI regulations prohibit "criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their 
race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, 
color, or national origin." 45 C.ER. § 80.3(b)(2). 
71. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (White, J., 
plurality opinion). 
72. In Guardians Association, the Court held that Title VI required only proof of disparate 
impact (and not discriminatory intent) where the plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, 
rather than money damages. In a plurality opinion, three of the five Justices concluded that, 
although Title VI itself required proof of intent to discriminate, the regulations promulgated 
under Title VI did not require proof of intent but were nonetheless valid. See id. at 642-45 
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es to hospital closings and relocations have utilized a rational basis test, 
which makes defending Title VI discrimination claims relatively easy for 
health care entities.73 Courts have upheld such actions even where 
plaintiffs have suggested less discriminatory alternatives.74 The lack of 
rigorous scrutiny in Title VI litigation creates significant barriers to 
challenging policies that have a disproportionate impact on minorities. 
Plaintiffs will prevail under this standard only if they can prove that the 
challenged policies are arbitrary and fail to advance any legitimate 
purpose. 
One commentator has suggested strengthening the standard of review 
for Title VI challenges. Under the proposed approach, the defendant 
would have to demonstrate that the challenged policy significantly 
furthers an important purpose.7S Courts would be required to give more 
consideration to the availability of less discriminatory alternatives as 
proof that the interests behind the challenged policy are insufficient to 
justify its disparate racial impact.76 Unless the courts accept such an 
approach, however, administrative agencies will shoulder most of the 
responsibility for enforcing Title VI in the health care arena. To date, 
they have not done so. 
In addition to statutory rights of action, patients who have suffered 
disparate treatment based on their race might consider an equal 
protection challenge. Interesting parallels exist between health care 
discrimination and recent scholarship suggesting constitutional approach­
es to what has been characterized as "environmental racism.'>77 As it 
(Stevens, 1., dissenting). Two Justices concluded that proof of discriminatory intent was not 
required as an element in establishing a Title VI violation. See id. at 592-93 (White, J., plurality 
opinion); id. at 623 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally 1 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 8.02[3], at 8-9 to 8-10 (3d ed. 1994). 
73. See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 R2d 1322, 1333-34 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that, 
even if plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of disparate impact, defendants need only 
present evidence of an acceptable reason but are not required to show absence of discriminatory 
motive). 
74. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 617-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Title VI does 
not require federal fund recipient to consider alternatives to the closing of a public health facility 
if the criteria used to make the decision are reasonably related to a goal such as cost savings). 
Judge Kearse urged the court to engage in a two-pronged evaluation of the agency action: (1) 
examine the process by which the decision was reached and (2) then inquire into the substantive 
merits of the decision. Id. at 623 (Kearse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
75. See Watson, supra note 66, at 976; see also Amy Jurevic, Disparate Impact Under 
Title VI: Discrimination, By Any Other Name, Will Still Have the Same Impact, 15 ST. LoUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 237, 264 (1996) (proposing that, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case 
of disparate impact, the disparate impact must be sufficiently justified). 
76. Watson, supra note 66, at 976. 
77. For example, recent articles have suggested that environmental racism impacts 
decisions such as siting of toxic dumps and cleanup efforts but conclude that equal protection 
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currently exists, however, equal protection analysis may not provide a 
workable remedy for existing health care disparities. First, plaintiffs will 
encounter difficulty demonstrating the necessary "state action" if their 
complaint centers around the decision of a provider not to pursue a 
particular course of treatment. The receipt of federal funding triggers 
statutory obligations but does not necessarily constitute state action, as 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.1s In all three of the contexts 
presented above-Medicare services, kidney allocation, and clinical tri­
als-plaintiffs will find it difficult to prove state action. 
Second, plaintiffs cannot easily prove discriminatory intent. If a 
plaintiff cannot prove an intent to discriminate, courts will simply 
examine whether the government had a rational basis for its actions, 
rather than reviewing the actions under a strict scrutiny standard.79 
Clearly, discrimination can exist without proof of invidious intent, but 
not all documented inequities across racial lines constitute discrimina­
tion. Intent in the equal protection context embodies ideas of willfulness 
and morally reprehensible motivation. 
Thus, as with statutory rights of action, constitutional challenges 
seem unavailing. No matter how compelling the evidence of racial 
inequities in the health care context, nothing convincingly suggests a 
pattern of widespread intentional discrimination. Even so, disparate 
health treatment decisions that do not result from poor preventive care, 
or from a patient's presenting a more acute condition, may well arise 
analysis is unlikely to assist those seeking to claim unlawful discrimination in these contexts. 
See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 20, at 979-80 (arguing that courts should abandon the intent standard 
and apply intermediate scrutiny instead); Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: 
A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 366,406-07 (1992) (discussing the requirement of discriminatory intent); cf. Lynn E. 
Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 132, 142 (1996) (noting that 
most environmental equity activists do not allege that siting decisions are made on the basis of 
invidious criteria but rather result from the "disproportionate impact of facially neutral policy 
choices," and suggesting that existing disproportionate impacts result from inequalities of 
wealth). 
78. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (finding no state action by 
a nursing home even though the bulk of its activities were financed by state Medicaid program); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (finding no state action by a private school 
even though the bulk of is funding was received from the state); see also Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) (holding that pervasive regulation of an activity does not 
by itself constitute state action). 
79. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976) (holding that plaintiff 
was required to prove discriminatory intent); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 R2d 
1181, 1216 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]o prove a claim of discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause a plaintiff must show not only that the state action complained of had a 
disproportionate or discriminatory impact but also that the defendant acted with the intent to 
discriminate."). 
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from unconsciously biased decisions on the part of health care profes­
sionals.8o Given these complexities, it may be appropriate to reconsider 
the current equal protection analysis requirement that plaintiffs prove 
intentional discrimination.81 
Socioeconomic factors explain only a portion of the racial disparities 
that exist in health care delivery. Recognition of these disparities, 
whatever their source, demands a swift response. The medical and legal 
communities must begin to address differences in the rate at which 
certain medical procedures are performed, organ allocation policies that 
create racial disparities in the rate of transplantation, and the failure to 
include historically underrepresented groups in clinical research. Existing 
legal remedies will provide little recourse to the victims of these 
disparities. Until changes in the relevant statutory and constitutional 
standards permit a judicial response, government agencies and the 
medical community must confront the problem at its source, by 
regulating and educating health care providers and others who control 
access to care. 
80. Cf. VerneJlia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care 
System Ain ~ Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 191, 231 (1996) (discussing the African-American bioethical perspective). Professor 
Randall concludes that the disparate care received by African-American patients constitutes a 
more explicit and avoidable kind of racism: "Eurocentric bioethical principles such as autonomy, 
beneficence, and informed consent ... leave considerable room for individual judgment by 
health care practitioners .•.. In a racist society (such as ours), the judgment is often exercised 
in a racist manner." Id. at 231. 
81. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-23 (1987) (critiquing the "false dichotomy" 
between disproportionate impact and intentional discrimination). Professor Lawrence argues that 
the required proof of discriminatory intent for an equal protection claim ignores the pervasive­
ness and the profound impact of unconscious discrimination. See id. at 324 (arguing that a 
collective unconscious within the general population is the origin of many discriminatory acts). 
He proposes a new test that would evaluate governmental conduct "to determine whether it 
conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance," in which case 
strict scrutiny would apply. Id. Professor Lawrence's test would not apply strict scrutiny in those 
cases where "nonrace-dependent decisions that disproportionately burden blacks only because 
they are overrepresented or underrepresented among the decision's targets or beneficiaries." [d. 
